Assessing blame for post-war Iraq

Phil Carter brings us a Strategic Research Paper from the Army War College that covers what should have happened and what went wrong in Iraq. Colonel Larry J. Godfrey submitted this report in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. EFFECTIVENESS OF STABILITY OPERATIONS DURING THE INITIAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TRANSITION PHASE FOR OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM
This is a 20 page PDF and I am going to snip out one small section of it:

PRECURSIVE PREDICTIONS ON THE WAR IN IRAQ
Prior to the invasion by coalition forces, there were numerous studies that identified specific areas that must be considered to succeed in creating a free and democratic Iraq. Although raising concerns and offering viable recommendations, these studies were neither embraced nor acted upon by the military. For example:

• In January 2003, about two months prior to the start of the attack on Iraq by the coalition forces, the Marine Warfighting Laboratory conducted wargaming analysis on the effect the Iraqi people will have on the conflict. This analysis showed that the first thirty to sixty days would be the most critical to influence the Iraqi people and the international community's perception. This report identified three activities that would be, at least initially, the responsibility of coalition forces, and absolutely critical to achieving success: (1) Maintaining a secure environment for the Iraq people, including law and order; (2) Maintaining basic necessities such as water, electricity, fuel, schools, and hospital services; and (3) Rapid return of infrastructure responsibility, including governance, back to Iraqis. The report also stated that potential for violence against coalition forces would increase with time if Iraqis’ quality of life did not improve over that realized during Saddam's regime and there must be a transition of governance back to Iraqis. Finally, the analysis stressed that humanitarian assistance groups required a safe and secure environment


• The State Department's "Future of Iraq" project, created in April 2002 to study the after-war in Iraq scenario, predicted widespread looting and other criminal activity. The report recommended coalition military patrol all major cities throughout Iraq to prevent such action, highlighting the need to protect the vital utilities and government buildings. Electrical, water, and sewage infrastructure would need major investment for repair. The report also recommended retaining half of the Iraqi military and converting them to a peacekeeping force, after being screened by U.S. Military Intelligence, and finding jobs for the remaining deactivated military. It also raised the point that Iraqi's media could be exploited to promote the U.S. goals in rebuilding Iraq.


• The Independent Task Force report sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, first issued on 12 March 2003, stated that the U.S. military must sustain public security and humanitarian assistance from the outset of the conflict. Post-conflict reconstruction endeavors must be in a secured environment to be achieved.


• A report from The Center for International and Strategic Studies by Bathsheba Crocker, which was published two months prior to conflict, stressed that a civil policing plan needed to be developed by the administration. The report asserted that until the environment was safe and secured, the U.S. military would have to fill the humanitarian assistance role of the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other relief agencies.


• The blue ribbon commission created by the Council on Foreign Relations and the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy of Rice University argued that the Iraqi Army should not be disbanded and should be used for the internal security of Iraq. Otherwise, there would be a large cohort of armed men, without a job or pay. This report addressed the disrepair of the electrical infrastructure in Iraq, painting a much worse picture than reflected by previous military, estimating a cost of $20 billion to restore to pre-Desert Storm capacity.

These predictions, by creditable and reputable sources, all stress that a secure environment would be necessary to succeed in Iraq. Post-conflict reconstruction and other stabilization activities would be significantly impacted without it.

As we can see even the Military had a pretty good idea of the pitfalls and what needed to be done. Their suggestions were ignored by the neo-cons in the administration. This really points out the arrogant incompetence of this administration.
NOTE
There may be some formatting errors in the above as the copy/paste operation from PDF to HTML has about as many pitfalls as invading Iraq.